I know not what years my readers served our once great Corps, but I am of the vintage of the writer of the article below. He and I have history that goes back to 1966-67 and carried forward to the late 1980’s.
Our first tour together was in Vietnam in 2/1. I “think” he was a lieutenant, but I could be wrong. As a lowly sergeant in Echo company I know not his assignment; I seem to recall he was a company XO? I attempted to research his assignment in several places, but his all Bio’s aren’t that specific.
The next time was in 9th Marines on Okinawa 1977-78. I was a captain serving as the regimentals Asst OPSO, and he was a major serving as the OPSO with 2/9. That was the start of my feelings concerning this officer. It’s all in the book should you desire more information.
The next time I was a colonel serving as the Training Director at LFTCLant in Norfolk. He was a frocked BG serving as the Asst CG of 2d Marine Division at CLNC. An incident during this tour solidified my opinion of him that still carries on today.
I did see him again a few years ago at a Naples MCL Birthday Ball. I approached him to simply say hello and he did not recognize me. Guess I never made much of an impression on him. He developed the nick name of “Chuckie Cheese Krulak” by some Marines, including me!
To flush out some memory cells, the one accomplishment he enjoys boasting about was he takes credit for establishing the “crucible” in recruit training.
His daddy was Lieutenant General Victor Krulak (aka “The Brute”). In 1964 he was assigned as the Commanding General of all Marine Forces in the Pacific theater (CG FMF Pac), which of course, included the war in Vietnam. Rumor had it he was looking forward to becoming CMC, but in 1967, LBJ choose Leonard F. Chapman instead — a wise choice in my view. The next year Daddy retired.
Now if you think Daddy did not have something to do with the son becoming CMC, you live under a rock. Seriously!
Taken from Project Syndicate, a newsletter purported to provide “a broad range of views by the world’s foremost leaders and thinkers on the issues, events, and forces shaping their lives. ” However, I shall let you decide on their statement
The disproportionate share of insurrectionists at the US Capitol with a military background are not representative of the armed forces as a whole. Nonetheless, as the divide between the military and US civilian society grows, even more attention will need to be paid to weeding out extremists.
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA – Revelations that the insurrection at the US Capitol included many former and current members of America’s armed forces have been met with alarm. And yet, as a 35-year veteran and retired commandant of the US Marine Corps, I saw the events of January 6 as the predictable culmination of a growing disconnect between the US military and civilian society.
Once home, many veterans joined organizations like the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion, where they were surrounded by like-minded people who had served, suffered, and sacrificed together. Jobs were plentiful, and Americans took pride in their country and their military.
Similarly, in the Korean War less than a decade later, though America was never “all in,” it nonetheless had clear strategic goals. As in WWII, US servicemen and women did a remarkable job and came home to an appreciative country.
But then came Vietnam, where most Americans never really knew what their country was fighting for. When the conflict finally came to its ignominious end in April 1975, there was no victory to celebrate (and it certainly was not fireworks that flew from the roof of the US embassy in Saigon). Unlike previous generations, those who fought in Vietnam were not honored for their service and sacrifice. Equally important, the public backlash against the war led to the end of military conscription, which fundamentally transformed the relationship between the military and the American people. The rift created by the shift to an all-volunteer military has grown wider ever since.
After Vietnam, America’s next major war was Desert Storm, in 1990. Again, clear strategic goals were met in a dramatic fashion, and US servicemen and women returned to a proud country – on the cusp of becoming the world’s only remaining superpower with the collapse of the Soviet Union the following year.
Yet by the end of the Gulf War, globalization and technological change had already begun to reshape American society. Old-line industries were being upended, and many manufacturing jobs were disappearing. Although immigration had only a minor effect on the big economic picture, it became a hot-button political issue for those who found themselves out of work. At the same time, a new wave of social-justice issues also started gaining momentum during this period. As a microcosm of America, the US military was not immune to these political dynamics.
It was against this political, social, and economic backdrop that America embarked on its “long war.” Much like Vietnam, the “War on Terror” lacks clear strategic goals and has lost public buy-in over time. Many of those who have fought it subscribe to the apocryphal refrain that while the military was at war, America was at Walmart. After serving multiple tours in Iraq or Afghanistan, servicemen and women who sacrificed years of their lives have received little recognition.
In his 1973 book, The American Way of War, the historian Russell F. Weigley quoted US General George C. Marshall as saying, “a democracy cannot fight a Seven Years’ War,” because any protracted conflict eventually will lose the support of the electorate. The longer a war runs – particularly when it becomes cross-generational – the greater the disconnect between the typical citizen and the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who serve.
he War on Terror is an abiding case in point, helping to shed light on the unrest and extremism that burst into public view at the Capitol. A small minority of alienated former and active service members have concluded that something is wrong in the America for which they fought and sacrificed. The past two presidential elections have fueled this discontent and convinced some that they have a duty to confront perceived domestic “enemies.” Political leaders, meanwhile, have exploited these sentiments for their own advantage.
The COVID-19 pandemic also contributed to a perfect storm. As the economy shed jobs – particularly at the lower end of the income distribution – face-to-face interactions were no longer possible. With deepening social atomization, it has become more difficult to experience solidarity. Angst or boredom have afflicted many, and some have found refuge in online communities espousing extremist ideologies. The 2020 presidential election brought the situation to a boiling point. A sitting commander-in-chief openly sought to overturn a free and fair election with lies and intimidation, and a small minority of his acolytes answered his call to action. Really?
But Americans should have faith. Notwithstanding a few outliers, the US military is unwavering in its support of, and dedication to, the US Constitution. Those in its ranks who harbor extremist views will be discovered and dealt with appropriately. Looking ahead, recruitment methods will be strengthened to weed out extremists. Recruiters will have to look not only at candidates’ social-media activity but also at their “body paint” (tattoos) and other potential indicators of extremist or racist sympathies. Interviews will need to be more pointed, and education for active members improved.
While the troubling trajectory of US military-civil relations has created fertile ground for some members to be radicalized, it is important to remember that the insurrectionists represent an exception. The US military has defended American democracy for centuries and will continue to do so, in keeping with our noblest traditions. Yes, I agree general, you can bet on it!
In sum, I categorize this fellow in the same company as Mattis, Allen, and all the other Kool Aid drinking generals viewing the military through their woke eyes and ears. Krulak says the recruiters will take care of this supposed problem. LOL What does he know about recruiting — Nothing!
For those unfamiliar, the Proceedings is a monthly journal published by the U.S. Naval Institute, which is a non-profit membership association serving a community of individuals who participate in an open forum to debate key issues in the Sea Services. There is no government support and they do not lobby for special interests. It is an independent, professional military association with a mission, goals, and objectives that transcend political affiliations. In other words it “ain’t” woke or non-woke. Every essay published in the Proceedings is very well documented and researched; they are strictly opinion pieces, but oh so interesting.
Please read this well thought-out and thoroughly documented essay that could very well be “The Plan.” Pay special attention to paragraph I have highlighted in blue. God help us!
Welcome to the U.S. Naval Institute
The home of influential debate since 1873
The U.S. Naval Institute provides an independent forum for those who seek to advance and strengthen the naval profession.
By Commander Norman R. Denny, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)
For decades, the U.S. Marine Corps has attempted to tweak its force structure to enhance performance within a constrained funding environment. Rather than continuing to make changes around the margins, we would be better off revisiting a debate started following World War II and prematurely truncated during the Korean War. Does the United States need a light infantry force specializing in amphibious operations as a separate service, or should the Marine Corps be resized to the small police force it was prior to World War I and the amphibious organization incorporated into the Army?
Krulak was right in 1957, and what he said is even more true today. The Army, Navy, and Air Force are fully capable of performing the Marine Corps’ missions. The Army can assume the light infantry and amphibious assault responsibilities. The 1944 invasion at Normandy, the largest invasion in history, was solely an Army effort for the United States. As far as Marine Corps air, the Navy and Air Force are fully capable of close air support, while the Army can also execute the needed rotary and tilt wing missions. The nation wants the Marines. The question may be how to keep the aspects the nation wants, while eliminating the Marines as a separate branch and reaping the benefits of a simplified chain of command, smaller overall force, and another base realignment and closure (BRAC) evolution.
Deconstructing the Marine Corps
So, what aspects does the nation want? If the Marine Corps answers that question, the answer will probably be what it currently has, but with better funding. The informal Marine Corps propaganda apparatus, which President Truman begrudgingly complimented as second in the world only to Joseph Stalin’s, will demand the status quo. For the first time in a generation, the lack of significant numbers of former service members in Congress—coupled with national fatigue after fighting an unsuccessful, two-decade-long war—may allow this topic to be discussed seriously.
Perhaps the easiest part of the current Marine Corps to remove is aviation. There is unlikely to be a huge support community with the nation for Marine aviation, especially the fixed-wing aspects. For most Americans, their knowledge of Marine aviation is likely limited to watching Flying Leathernecks (1951) and The Great Santini (1979). Likewise, the average citizen may see no difference between Marine rotary and tilt-wing aviation and its Army equivalents. The average citizen likely sees no difference because the differences that do exist—primarily the ability to fly from ships—are minor. The nation does not need a separate Marine Corps aviation force and few in the nation likely know enough about it to want it. Eliminating Marine aviation by incorporating it into the Army and Navy would halve the size of the service, which currently is around 184,000 active-duty members.
The U.S. public is far less likely to accept the complete disappearance of the Fleet Marine Forces, the ubiquitous “Mud Marine.” Stripped of aviation, the Marine Corps would resemble the Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps, both in size (approximately 88,000 troops) and capabilities—both are light infantry, both are air-mobile, and both are capable of airborne and amphibious operations. Both consider themselves to be “elite” forces with strong esprit de corps. Transition of the Fleet Marine Forces into the Army’s yet-to-be created XIX Marine Amphibious Corps would retain the needed amphibious expertise, simplify the chain of command, and could be done in a way that retains many of the unique elements that make a Marine a Marine.
Establishing the Army’s XIX Marine Amphibious Corps at Camp Pendleton on the west coast would give the nation a light infantry “center of excellence” on each coast. Reducing the Marine Corps Commandant to a three-star general, mirroring the XVIII Corps commander, would help reduce the gradual increase in rank structure seen over the past 50 years across the Department of Defense (DoD). Army traditions are likely flexible enough to retain many of the cherished Marine Corps’ accoutrement, like the dress blues and the eagle, globe and anchor emblem. The Army airborne troops currently have their maroon berets and cavalry units have their cowboy hats and spurs. Also, if the XVIII Corps can informally use the term “top” for the command first sergeant, the XIX Corps might well use “gunny” for E-7s. Likewise, young men and women could enlist to be Marines and continue to go through Parris Island for boot camp.
Incorporating the Marine Corps into the Army would significantly simplify the DoD chain of command and eliminate the need for the Commandant to go to the Army and beg for future armor and artillery support. Likewise, the Marines of the XIX Corps would have an equal chance of obtaining any new capabilities integrated into the Army, while potentially allowing Army leaders to reduce the operational tempo of both Corps, although both will still be rapid-deployment units.
To say that Marines would resist incorporation into the Army and Navy is a gross understatement. However, there are concessions that might make it slightly less toxic for the Marines and less objectionable to the public and Congress. Allowing Marine fixed-wing pilots inducted into the Navy to finish out their career using Marine Corps ranks and uniforms would likely help and given the Navy’s history of mixed uniforms, would probably go unnoticed by the public. Similar concessions for the generation of current Marines incorporated into the Army could potentially ease their transition. But regardless of how successful these mitigation efforts are, the DoD would likely be looking at a decade of angst and occasional confusion. The key will be Congress, which will have to rewrite legislation, including U.S. Title 10. As mentioned previously, there are fewer Marines in Congress today than at any time since the early 1950s (there are 15 Marine Corps veterans in the 117th Congress). This, coupled with the inevitable savings from another round of base closures, might be enough to see the initiative championed by President Truman and advocated by Generals Eisenhower and Marshall completed.
General Krulak correctly stated the United States does not need but wants the Marine Corps. For the best interests of the nation, the DoD should at least learn if the U.S. public and Congress will accept a XIX Marine Amphibious Corps. If the answer is yes, then a myriad of questions will have to be answered: Does the nation need two separate light infantry corps? Which Marine Corps installations will be closed or reduced? How many Marine Corps military and civilian personnel, made redundant by the changes, will be discharged? And what, if anything, will remain as a Navy police force? If the topic is given a fair hearing, the answers may surprise us all.
Commander Denny is a retired reserve naval intelligence officer with service beginning in Vietnam in 1972 as an aviation electrician’s mate and retiring in 2010 as a commander. In addition to his reserve service, he was a civilian electronics engineer for the Army Missile Command and an intelligence analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), with four deployments to Iraq. After retiring from DIA, he served as a senior intelligence analyst for U.S. Central Command with one additional Iraq tour.
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA – Revelations that the insurrection at the US Capitol included many former and current members of America’s armed forces have been met with alarm. And yet, as a 35-year veteran and retired commandant of the US Marine Corps, I saw the events of January 6 as the predictable culmination of a growing disconnect between the US military and civilian society.
Once home, many veterans joined organizations like the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion, where they were surrounded by like-minded people who had served, suffered, and sacrificed together. Jobs were plentiful, and Americans took pride in their country and their military.
Similarly, in the Korean War less than a decade later, though America was never “all in,” it nonetheless had clear strategic goals. As in WWII, US servicemen and women did a remarkable job and came home to an appreciative country.
But then came Vietnam, where most Americans never really knew what their country was fighting for. When the conflict finally came to its ignominious end in April 1975, there was no victory to celebrate (and it certainly was not fireworks that flew from the roof of the US embassy in Saigon). Unlike previous generations, those who fought in Vietnam were not honored for their service and sacrifice. Equally important, the public backlash against the war led to the end of military conscription, which fundamentally transformed the relationship between the military and the American people. The rift created by the shift to an all-volunteer military has grown wider ever since.
After Vietnam, America’s next major war was Desert Storm, in 1990. Again, clear strategic goals were met in a dramatic fashion, and US servicemen and women returned to a proud country – on the cusp of becoming the world’s only remaining superpower with the collapse of the Soviet Union the following year.
Yet by the end of the Gulf War, globalization and technological change had already begun to reshape American society. Old-line industries were being upended, and many manufacturing jobs were disappearing. Although immigration had only a minor effect on the big economic picture, it became a hot-button political issue for those who found themselves out of work. At the same time, a new wave of social-justice issues also started gaining momentum during this period. As a microcosm of America, the US military was not immune to these political dynamics.
It was against this political, social, and economic backdrop that America embarked on its “long war.” Much like Vietnam, the “War on Terror” lacks clear strategic goals and has lost public buy-in over time. Many of those who have fought it subscribe to the apocryphal refrain that while the military was at war, America was at Walmart. After serving multiple tours in Iraq or Afghanistan, servicemen and women who sacrificed years of their lives have received little recognition.
In his 1973 book, The American Way of War, the historian Russell F. Weigley quoted US General George C. Marshall as saying, “a democracy cannot fight a Seven Years’ War,” because any protracted conflict eventually will lose the support of the electorate. The longer a war runs – particularly when it becomes cross-generational – the greater the disconnect between the typical citizen and the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who serve.
he War on Terror is an abiding case in point, helping to shed light on the unrest and extremism that burst into public view at the Capitol. A small minority of alienated former and active service members have concluded that something is wrong in the America for which they fought and sacrificed. The past two presidential elections have fueled this discontent and convinced some that they have a duty to confront perceived domestic “enemies.” Political leaders, meanwhile, have exploited these sentiments for their own advantage.
The COVID-19 pandemic also contributed to a perfect storm. As the economy shed jobs – particularly at the lower end of the income distribution – face-to-face interactions were no longer possible. With deepening social atomization, it has become more difficult to experience solidarity. Angst or boredom have afflicted many, and some have found refuge in online communities espousing extremist ideologies. The 2020 presidential election brought the situation to a boiling point. A sitting commander-in-chief openly sought to overturn a free and fair election with lies and intimidation, and a small minority of his acolytes answered his call to action. Really?
But Americans should have faith. Notwithstanding a few outliers, the US military is unwavering in its support of, and dedication to, the US Constitution. Those in its ranks who harbor extremist views will be discovered and dealt with appropriately. Looking ahead, recruitment methods will be strengthened to weed out extremists. Recruiters will have to look not only at candidates’ social-media activity but also at their “body paint” (tattoos) and other potential indicators of extremist or racist sympathies. Interviews will need to be more pointed, and education for active members improved.
While the troubling trajectory of US military-civil relations has created fertile ground for some members to be radicalized, it is important to remember that the insurrectionists represent an exception. The US military has defended American democracy for centuries and will continue to do so, in keeping with our noblest traditions. Yes, I agree general, you can bet on it!
CHARLES C. KRULAK
Writing for PS since 2020
4 Commentaries
In sum, I categorize this fellow in the same company as Mattis, Allen, and all the other Kool Aid drinking generals viewing the military through their woke eyes and ears. Krulak says the recruiters will take care of this supposed problem. LOL What does he know about recruiting — Nothing!