Tag Archives: war

Task & Purpose

Greg Newbold is one of the smartest, most professional Marines with whom I ever had the pleasure of serving. We were Captains together in the Ninth Marines at Camp Schwab, Okinawa 1977-78. Even among us captains, we all had a sense that Greg was destined  to become a flag officer.
Captains Tad Curtis and Greg Newbold outside the BOQs, Camp Schwab, Okinawa,  1977. Tad was my suite mate.

Knowing him as I do, it comes as no surprise that Greg has been one of the few flag officers of any branch who have come out against the travesty besetting our military today.  He never was one to mince words, and no one could exchange verbiage with him. I remember a story going around from  years ago about, a “word war” ensuing between Greg and his boss. As I recall, Greg was two-star  and at a press conference he used the word eviscerate. Later his boss, a pompous Air Force three-star “tried” to make fun of Greg by saying he didn’t know Marines were smart enough to use such big words like eviscerate. Greg started using words at press conferences that the news reporters didn’t know their meaning. The three-star lost the war.

Greg does a great job of laying it out in simple terms for everyone to read and “hopefully” understand. Of course the arrogant, know-it-all, Woke generals of today in every branch, including our current CMC,  aren’t smart enough to truly understand about which Greg is speaking. Sad. None of them could hold a candle to this Officer of Marines. Read and be informed by someone who has been there , done that!

From “Task & Purpose”

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Many Americans, particularly our most senior politicians and military leaders, seem to have developed a form of dementia when it comes to warfare. The result is confusion or denial about the essential ingredients of a competent military force, and the costs of major power conflict. The memory loss is largely irrespective of political bent because all too many are seduced by a Hollywood-infused sense of antiseptic warfare and push-button solutions, while forgotten are the one million casualties of the Battle of the Somme in World War I, or the almost two million in the Battle of Stalingrad in World War II.

This “warfare dementia” is a dangerous and potentially catastrophic malady, because the price for it could alter the success of the American experiment and most assuredly will be paid in blood. The condition is exacerbated and enabled when the most senior military leaders — those who ought to know better — defer to the idealistic judgments of those whose credentials are either nonexistent or formed entirely by ideology.

The purpose of this essay is to explain the fundamental tenets of a military that will either deter potential enemies or decisively win the nation’s wars, thereby preserving our way of life. What follows are the tenets of Critical Military Theory:

1. The U.S. military has two main purposes — to deter our enemies from engaging us in warfare, and if that fails, to defeat them in combat. Deterrence is only possible if the opposing force believes it will be defeated. Respect is not good enough; fear and certainty are required.

  • Relevant Wisdom: “If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for War.” George Washington.

2. To be true to its purpose, the U.S. military cannot be a mirror image of the society it serves. Values that are admirable in civilian society — sensitivity, individuality, compassion, and tolerance for the less capable — are often antithetical to the traits that deter a potential enemy and win the wars that must be fought: Conformity, discipline, unity.

Direct ground combat, of the type we must be prepared to fight, is only waged competently when actions are instinctive, almost irrationally disciplined, and wholly sacrificial when required. Consensus building, deference, and (frankly) softness have their place in polite society, but nothing about intense ground combat is polite — it is often sub-humanly coarse.

  • Relevant Wisdom: “We sleep soundly in our beds because rough men stand ready in the night to do violence on those who would harm us.” Attributed to George Orwell, possibly originally from Richard Grenier.

3. There is only one overriding standard for military capability: lethality. Those officeholders who dilute this core truth with civil society’s often appropriate priorities (diversity, gender focus, etc.) undermine the military’s chances of success in combat. Reduced chances for success mean more casualties, which makes defeat more likely. Combat is the harshest meritocracy that exists, and nothing but ruthless adherence to this principle contributes to deterrence and combat effectiveness.

  • Relevant Wisdom: “I shall see no officer under my command is debarred….from attending to his first duty, which is and always has been to train the private men under his command that they may without question beat any force opposed to them in the field.” The Duke of Wellington

4. A military should not be designed to win but to overwhelm. In baseball, you win if your total score is one run better than your opponent’s. In war, narrow victories incur what we call “the butcher’s bill.”

  • Relevant Wisdom: “But these things do not belong to war itself; they are only given conditions; and to introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation would be an absurdity.” Carl Von Clausewitz.

5. Wars must be waged only with stone-cold pragmatism, not idealism, and fought only when critical national interests are at stake. Hopes for changing cultures to fit our model are both elitist and naive. The failures of our campaigns in Iraq and especially in Afghanistan confirm this.

  • Relevant Wisdom. “They enjoy playing poker with someone else’s chips.” B.V. Taylor

6. A military force’s greatest strengths are cohesion and discipline. Individuality or group identity is corrosive and a centrifugal force. Indeed, the military wears uniforms because uniformity is essential. The tenets of Critical Race Theory – a cross-disciplinary intellectual and social movement that seeks to examine the intersection of race and law in the United States, but which has the unfortunate effect of dividing people along racial lines – undermine our military’s unity and diminish our warfighting capabilities.

Recruit training teaches close order drill and the manual of arms (drill with weapons) not because they still have relevance to maneuvers on the field of battle, but because they instill a sense of how conformity creates efficiency and superior group results. Upon a firm foundation of cohesion, imaginative leaders can spark initiative and innovation. But when we highlight differences or group identity, we undermine cohesion and morale. Failure results.

  • Relevant Wisdom: “Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely. There is the science of the organization of armies in a nutshell.” Colonel Ardant du Picq.

7. “The enemy gets a vote.” An objective lens for military theory is how the nation’s foes regard our martial ethos; after all, that is what constitutes deterrence…or lack of it. Ferocity, not sensitivity, prevails.

  • Relevant Wisdom: “We will not fight them. They are not normal. When we shoot at them, they run towards us. If we fight them, we die. They are worse than the sons of Satan.” Taliban radio intercept after engaging U.S. forces.

8. Infantry and special operations forces are different. The mission of those who engage in direct ground combat is manifestly distinct, and their standards and requirements must be as well. Not necessarily better, but different. For direct ground combat units, only the highest levels of discipline, fitness, cohesion, esprit, and just plain grit are acceptable. Insist on making their conditions and standards conform to other military communities, and you weaken the temper of steel in these modern-day Spartans.

  • Relevant Wisdom: “It is fatal to enter a war without the will to win it.” General Douglas MacArthur.

9. Those who enlist in our military swear an oath to carry out dangerous, sometimes fatal duties. We call it “being in the service,” because it’s service to others….selfless sacrifices when the other option was often more comfort, freedom, individuality, and higher pay. Those who occupy the most senior ranks of the military must repay this selflessness with courage that is even rarer — moral courage. Civilian control of the military is indisputable, but its corollary is the ordinary principle that advice is sought, offered, and seriously considered before crucial decisions are made. My personal experience provides examples — the willful exclusion of military judgments in the build-up to the Iraq War with the attendant consequence that the invasion force was too shallow (thereby creating a vacuum which the insurgents quickly filled), and the decision to disband the Iraqi Army (the single most unifying institution in that country) after the collapse of the Baathist regime. A more recent example worth considering involves the Afghanistan withdrawal.

  • Relevant Wisdom: “There’s a great deal of talk about loyalty from the bottom to the top.  Loyalty from the top down is even more necessary and is much less prevalent.” General George S. Patton.

So what’s the problem? The problem today is one of both priorities and standards. We signal a dangerous shift in priorities (as just one example) when global warming, not preparedness to defeat aggressive global competitors, is considered the greatest problem for the Department of Defense and headquarters and rank inflation blossom out of control to the point that the support element greatly diminishes the ground combat element that wins wars. A problem of standards when every service and the Special Operations community dilute requirements based purely on merit in favor of predetermined outcomes to favor social engineering goals, and when new training requirements crowd out expectations and measurements of combat performance.

This principle is the most clearly and frequently violated in our current military environment. Although the examples are many, the most egregious sidestepping of scientific evidence occurred when the U.S. Marine Corps’ lengthy examination of the effects of integrated (coed) ground combat performance was refuted and ignored (often by those who hadn’t read it). This brings to mind the verbiage used in another context: “inconvenient truths.”

The critical tasks outlined above may omit some essentials, but these serve as a starter and perhaps as a wake-up call. We have witnessed extraordinary and sacrificial service by our Armed Forces — too good to squander by confusing our military’s purpose with those of individuals who don’t pay in blood for their errors. And too good for a foe to misjudge our intrinsic toughness. In any case, these are not Critical Military Theories; these are Critical Military Facts.

Greg Newbold is a retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General who commanded at every level from platoon to division.  His last assignment was as Director of Operations for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon. In retirement, he operated a science and technology think tank, and co-founded a private equity firm and consulting group. He has been a director on a dozen non-profit and for profit companies.

The Corps Part III

I hope all enjoyed a feast yesterday and now have lots of “stuff” to sustain several meals left over.  I love cold turkey sandwiches’ with lettuce, and some cranberries spread about. Yum!

Okay, continuing the sad saga of the destruction of all that was good about the once recognized as the toughest military organization in the world — actually the most feared by our enemies. Read about it, it’s in the history books . Remember Belleau Woods?

Anyway, I keep getting mor emails telling me more and more of what’s happening. Which is good since I read no newspapers nor watch any news. Thanks to those contributing! So, here is more from the “boss.”

US Marine Corps Adopts New Commitment to Diversity and Representation Within Its Ranks

Recognizing the importance of diversity, equity and inclusion in all aspects of life, including the military, the U.S. Marine Corps has announced a new plan designed to help the storied institution “reinvent” itself to look more like modern America.

NPR’s Emma Bowman and Rachel Martin reported that “the Marine Corps, the smallest U.S. military force, has plans for a big overhaul designed to address its lack of diversity and problem with retaining troops.” Now there are two reporters that everyone believes, right? They can be trusted to report nothing but facts. LOL

Gen. David Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, told NPR that “the goal that’s driving what amounts to a cultural shift within the service is for the Marines ‘to reflect America, to reflect the society we come from.’”

In the interview, Gen. Berger was quick to point out that the change was not meant to reflect “political correctness” or an attempt at being “woke.” Instead, the policy change was a general reflection that all institutions, including the Marines, are better when they include voices, insight and knowledge from a variety of different backgrounds, races and ethnicities. In short, Gen. Berger said America’s strength comes from its diversity, adding that it is also true for the military.

“Our advantage militarily is on top of our shoulders,” Gen. Berger told NPR. “It’s not actually our equipment. We are better than anybody else, primarily because we don’t all think exactly alike. We didn’t come from the same backgrounds.”

Oh really, I thought Boot Camp and OCS took care of that difference and made us all Marines? I guess we don’t want that anymore??

To help bring his vision to fruition, the general and other Marine leaders have created a new plan titled “Talent Management 2030” that includes a number of different measures the Marine Corps will implement in the coming years to not only help increase diversity within recruitment but also aid in improving career flexibility and retainment with the military branch.

“About 75% of troops leave the Marine Corps at the end of their four-year term, the highest turnover rate among the military services,” Bowman and Martin reported. “To compete in an age of cyber warfare and space-based weaponry, the Marines wants (sic) to shake its ‘manpower’ model that historically prized youth, physical fitness and discipline over education, training and technical skills. According to the new plan, the aim is to grow a corps that is ‘more intelligent, physically fit, cognitively mature and experienced.’”

Gen. Berger said although he is eager to see the changes take shape, he was also realistic with his plan, realizing that it will take time for a reform of this scale to work its way through the Marine Corps, especially reaching senior leadership. He said this is especially true with the Marines since the branch didn’t open its ranks to women until 2016. What? That’s a spin, a play on words. Currently, less than 10% of active-duty Marines are female compared to the 20% to 25% range of other military branches.

 

“We are a purely combat force,” he said, pointing out how the Marines differ from Army, Navy and Air Force. “We were built under a different set of circumstances — but that is changing.”

Yes sir general it certainly is!

A Little History

Failure in Afghanistan Has Roots in the All-Volunteer Military

For the past three decades, careerism among senior officers coupled with the disconnect between the American public and the All-Volunteer Force have led to failed and unnecessary overseas military interventions.

The tragedy that unfolded over the past several weeks in Afghanistan began with the creation of the “all-volunteer” military in 1973 and the self-promoting careerism that has stalked the Pentagon ever since. Too few leaders have been willing to speak truth to power and say no to overseas military adventurism that had little bearing on the safety and security of this nation. And it goes without saying that those in charge when the war begins are never those who have to finish it.

We saw this most clearly when, in 1990-91, America sent its young warriors into the deserts of the Middle East. We called it “The Gulf War” and “Desert Storm,” but it was, in reality, America’s first mercenary war. The Bush administration cut a deal with the Saudis and Kuwaitis: our men, their money. Kuwaiti “princes” lived large in hotels from Saudi Arabia to Paris while our young soldiers and Marines dug fighting holes in the desert under a searing sun.

U.S. Marines in Desert Storm
U.S. Marines in Operation Desert Storm in 1991. (Naval Institute archives)
The peacetime, all-volunteer military, after all, was a good job with benefits and perks. And that “war” went relatively well and quickly with few American servicemembers killed or injured, to the high praise of the U.S. public who were entranced, awed, and seduced by the lethality, performance, and accuracy of our high-tech weapons, while forgetting that the troops on the ground, in the desert, held it all together and made the irrefutable success of the war possible. Yet it was also the start of the forever wars. Saddam Hussein remained in power after the war and the U.S. military remained in the Middle East—enforcing no-fly zones and oil embargoes on Iraq with naval forces in the Persian Gulf and air and land forces based in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.

While it might be a “chicken or the egg” argument, it is hard not to see that the permanent increase of U.S. military presence in the Middle East went hand in hand with the rise of militant Islam and anti-American terrorism. How many Americans remember the 1996 terrorist bombing of a U.S. Air Force barracks in Khobar, Saudi Arabia? Nineteen U.S. servicemembers were killed and 498 wounded. Two years later, the embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya killed 12 Americans and hundreds of civilians and wounded 4,500 people. Then came the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67) in Aden, Yemen, killing 17 sailors and injuring dozens of others. Less than a year later came the 9/11 attacks, answered shortly by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. A little over a year later, under the false pretense that non-existent Iraqi weapons of mass destruction would be used against the United States, came the invasion of Iraq.

Khobar Towers bombing in 1996 in Saudi Arabia
The 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia killed 19 U.S. servicemembers and injured nearly 500 more. 

By the end of 2003, U.S. special operations forces had completed much of their mission in Afghanistan to capture or kill senior leaders and high-value targets within both al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The Pentagon, however, rather than putting their “swords” away somehow decided to “nation build” a medieval land of warring tribes into a Western-style democracy, ignoring the fact that our democracy took centuries and many great wars to achieve.

For the past 31 years, the brunt of the cost has been borne by the all-volunteer force. The majority of American citizens have not served (none were required to), and most know few who have. A few dozen—or even a few hundred—servicemembers killed per year was the cost of doing business. But where were the generals and admirals who should have stood up to the civilian leaders, without compromise, to say “enough,”—that foreign wars too often leave our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines dead and forgotten, and for what? Were the military’s senior leaders just following along in-line, waiting for their moment, their chance for another star, or a richly coveted post-retirement job with a “vendor.” Were they just inured to the burdens of the profession? Unable to see the giant machine in which they were cogs—the failed foreign policy that resulted in the spilling of blood and national treasure for questionable (if any) gain.

It is no surprise that the “war” in Afghanistan eventually became a bottomless money pit. More than a trillion dollars was spent; did it make our nation safer, or did it just make Washington-connected corporations rich? Some of that money was funneled back to Congress through campaign donations and favors, all the while young Americans were being killed and wounded. Walk into any Veterans Administration hospital and see first-hand the reality that was brought home.

So, with the most recent deaths and injuries at Kabul International airport—clearly caused by a lack of planning, foresight, and courage at the top—we witness more evidence of the ongoing tragedy and travesty that is American “foreign policy” and the willingness of senior military leaders to go along with it. Will we ever learn? History suggests, no.

Postscript: While some commenters on the  actual article disagree with the author, I do not. I understand where he is coming from and follow his line of thought completely. The disconnect between the American public in general and the military and their assigned missions is indeed relevant. A quick “war story” if I may.

Serving as a temporary Chief of Staff at a command when the actual made a quick decision to retire, I had to handle my job as well for a few months while the Corps had to find a colonel for the billet. After a few months of this double duty my general, a fresh-caught BG, comes in my office with a cup of coffee to shoot the bull. Out of the blue he calmly says, Jim you know you will never make general.” To which I laughed telling him all I ever wanted to be was a Gunny. He asked if I wanted to know why, and of course I knew he wanted to tell me so I said yes.

He told me he knew several generals who would jump at having me as their COS because I had a knack of letting seniors (and juniors) know that if they cannot handle your answer they should never ask me the question. He said generals cannot do that. They must always speak the party line or they will never move above one star, which is why so many generals retire as a BG. They spoke outside the party line once and were passed over, or they  want nothing to do with it and retire.

Personally, I took his comments as compliment as that philosophy helped me to rise from private to colonel, and I was not about to change it. When a general speaks, understand he is never telling you what he truly believes in his heart. He is simply a mouth piece for the admisntration at the time.

Kilo 3

I have read only one Vietnam War book in my lifetime. It was Fields of Fire by James Webb. While I did enjoy the book, the author is a POS as far as I am concerned; therefore, I am not touting his book.

Since I participated in the original “play,” I have chosen not to read someone else’s version of how he experienced the war, much of which is, in my view, a “war story” that gets better each time it’s told.; including mine LOL.

Having said that I am making an exception. Why you ask? It’s simple, I know the author very well. If you read my book, We’ll All Die as Marines, he is mentioned in it. I’ll not; however, tell you what chapter. Yeah, I know that’s mean. All I shall divulge is I was a fresh caught brown bar. That should surely take you right to the place if you still have the book. If not write me and I will sell you one. LOL.

Anyway, I digress. The book of which I speak was just released a few weeks ago. Its title is, Kilo 3. For Marines that should tell you it was Kilo Company of the 3rd battalion, of some regiment. Well, it’s the Striking Ninth, none other than the 9th Marine Regiment of the Third Marine Division, traditionally written a K 3/9.

I’ll not share any of the book with you as that would be cheating the author. I will; however, say this book makes Webb’s read seem like a child’s fairy tale. For those who have not experienced combat from an infantryman’s perspective, you will be enlightened beyond belief. As I read I could smell the cordite, feel the anger, hear the different types of explosions as he describes them perfectly, experience the sweat and intense heat, and remember the danger and fear.

However, this read is more than about the Vietnam War. It’s about leaving the blood, sweat, and horror of that horrible war and stepping into the glamour, perfectionism, and discipline of the Corp’s most famous and fabled duty station — Marine Barracks, 8th & I Streets SE, Washington, D.C. Many did exactly that during the 1968-69 timeframe, I was one of them, so I know what these Marines went through. Many did not make the cut. This read is about one who almost didn’t, but because OZ didn’t give him anything he didn’t already have, he not only made it, he made it big time!

That’s all I will tell you, except to repeat myself, I am certain you will thoroughly enjoy it. I stared reading it around noon on Saturday and finished it Sunday evening, and I am a slow reader. I could not put it down! I then called the author and congratulated him and thanked him profusely for sending me a signed copy..

 

Front Dust Cover

Back Dust Cover