Finally!

FINALLY!  Generals from all services are beginning to speak out against what CMC is doing to the Marine Corps. Many have met with him, but state, he took notes, asked no questions, and changed nothing. This first article is from a Marine I know very well. I was his Company GySgt for a short while, until I was commissioned and  stayed in the same company; he was a Capt at the time. I served with him again when he was a Colonel and  G-1 of the 2d Marine Division. Then again when I had 2/6 and was going to become 2/8, he was my regimental CO. Then yet again when he was a fresh caught  BG at LFTCLant. So, I know him fairly well.

I and several others pegged him as a future general when he was nothing but a captain at 8th & I. The smartest, most capable Marine officer I ever met throughout my career. When he made four star he was assigned as  Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic and Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command. Consider the significance of that assignment. The first time ever that a non-naval officer was assigned to that billet. He controlled all the  forces, including the navy ships throughout the Atlantic!

General Jack knows his stuff, so I am heartened by the fact he has finally come to life. Someone had  best listen to him, specifically another four star named Berger!

Wasteful Spending, a Shrinking Force and the Marine Corps’s Big Bet

The Marines may be “the only branch adapting fast for the future” (“U.S. Defense After Ukraine,” Review & Outlook, March 8), but what future and how wisely? The military’s poor record of predicting the next war urges maintaining flexibility. This has long been a strength of the Marine Corps, which maintained itself for decades as a combined-arms force in readiness, rapidly deployable, balanced and able to organize for any mission. This has proved its worth to the nation at all levels of crisis and conflict.

Yet today the Marine Corps is betting all on a conflict with China in the Western Pacific, to the neglect of other contingencies, creating littoral regiments to be scattered in small units across island chains to engage Chinese ships with missiles as part of a campaign for sea control. To pay the bill for this new vision of war, the Marine Corps has already got rid of all its tanks. It is reducing cannon artillery from 21 to five active batteries, eliminating three infantry battalions and reducing those remaining by a third in manpower, and reducing air power and other combat support commensurately. The war in Ukraine shows the folly of this. Or should someone tell the Russians and Ukrainians these systems are all obsolete?

These initiatives risk turning the Marine Corps into a niche force optimized for one conflict that is unlikely to occur, while hobbling its ability to meet security challenges that are certain. This is not what the nation needs or expects from its Marine Corps.

Gen. J.J. (Jack) Sheehan, USMC (Ret.)

Alexandria, Va.

Mr. Sheehan was NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (1994-97). How dare the WSJ refer to this Marine as “Mr.”

Another general speaks out in the same WSJ article.

The editorial board has been right on its defense analysis for months. Now it is correct about our defense-budget outlook, especially the relationship between the creeping inefficiencies that have plagued the Pentagon and our need to modernize.

If Vladimir Putin is successful, he will not stop at Ukraine. Nor will Xi Jinping stop at Taiwan. America must be ready to combat these threats and adjust to the end of the post-Cold War order. That will require more defense spending—a reality that our NATO allies are coming to grasp as well. But if we don’t get more bang for the buck, these spending increases won’t yield the capabilities we need to defend our freedoms, which are at risk.

Though we spend more today in constant dollars than we did at the peak of the Reagan buildup, we have a smaller force by all measures. The largest drivers of this ever-shrinking fighting force are a broken acquisition system that costs more, takes longer and produces less; the excessive amount of money tied up in the Pentagon’s massive, layered overhead and support functions; and the fully burdened and life-cycle costs of the all-volunteer force, with its outdated personnel management, compensation and retirement programs.

Without reforms, we will not improve our capabilities in either the quality or quantity necessary. The Pentagon and Congress need to establish performance goals that ensure we are better, faster and cheaper than our adversaries. The focus needs to be on outputs, not only inputs.

Congress should also fund the government through a regular process instead of the insanity of never-ending continuing resolutions, which already cost the Defense Department close to $40 billion in purchasing power in this fiscal year. The Pentagon and defense-industrial base need steady, predictable funding. Budget chaos is no way to deter our adversaries.

Maj. Gen. Arnold Punaro, USMC (Ret.)

McLean, Va.

Mr. Punaro is author of “The Ever-Shrinking Fighting Force.”

Your editorial observes that President Jimmy Carter “did a 180-degree turn . . . and began a defense buildup.” This is a bit generous. Alarmed by the enormous Soviet military program and the overthrow of the shah, NATO countries agreed to each undertake a 3% increase in real defense spending. Yet when Mr. Carter offered his budget for fiscal year 1980, his defense numbers were closer to half that, which his spokesmen rationalized with the fatuous claim that the part relevant to NATO had met the target.

In the face of this foot-dragging, two “defense Democrats,” Sens. Ernest Hollings and Sam Nunn, took matters into their own hands, introducing an amendment to raise the overall number by 3%, as pledged, and by 5% the next year. The Carter administration lobbied strenuously against this, yet it passed 55-42. This began the buildup that was carried much further by the Reagan administration, contributing to victory in the Cold War.

Joshua Muravchik

Wheaton, Md.

Mr. Muravchik was executive director of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (1977-79).

STRENGTH    RESPECTS    STRENGTH. Always has, always will, Amen

4 thoughts on “Finally!”

  1. It was refreshing to see two USMC generals respond in the WSJ. Given they are retired, does anyone treading water in the DC Swamp and the Pentagon, in particular, really CARE what their opinions are no matter how formulated and accurate their argument is?

    1. No they do not Greg, that my friend is the problem. They need to be gone some way or another. Including the CMC himself!!!!!

  2. Jim, you might remember that Gen Fulford promoted me to LtCol while at LFTCLant and from there I went to SACLANT. Gen Sheehan was my boss. There were only two Marines on that staff. General Sheehan and me! 🙂

    1. Yes, I remember Tom. General Jack was the smartest, most knowledgeable Marine with whom I ever served. He had that air about him that intimidated people regardless of their rank. I have tons of stories about him from captain through four-star! LOL

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