Failure in Afghanistan Has Roots in the All-Volunteer Military
For the past three decades, careerism among senior officers coupled with the disconnect between the American public and the All-Volunteer Force have led to failed and unnecessary overseas military interventions.
By Paul Cavallo
September 2021
Proceedings
Vol. 147/9/1423
The tragedy that unfolded over the past several weeks in Afghanistan began with the creation of the “all-volunteer” military in 1973 and the self-promoting careerism that has stalked the Pentagon ever since. Too few leaders have been willing to speak truth to power and say no to overseas military adventurism that had little bearing on the safety and security of this nation. And it goes without saying that those in charge when the war begins are never those who have to finish it.
We saw this most clearly when, in 1990-91, America sent its young warriors into the deserts of the Middle East. We called it “The Gulf War” and “Desert Storm,” but it was, in reality, America’s first mercenary war. The Bush administration cut a deal with the Saudis and Kuwaitis: our men, their money. Kuwaiti “princes” lived large in hotels from Saudi Arabia to Paris while our young soldiers and Marines dug fighting holes in the desert under a searing sun.
U.S. Marines in Operation Desert Storm in 1991. (Naval Institute archives)
The peacetime, all-volunteer military, after all, was a good job with benefits and perks. And that “war” went relatively well and quickly with few American servicemembers killed or injured, to the high praise of the U.S. public who were entranced, awed, and seduced by the lethality, performance, and accuracy of our high-tech weapons, while forgetting that the troops on the ground, in the desert, held it all together and made the irrefutable success of the war possible. Yet it was also the start of the forever wars. Saddam Hussein remained in power after the war and the U.S. military remained in the Middle East—enforcing no-fly zones and oil embargoes on Iraq with naval forces in the Persian Gulf and air and land forces based in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.
While it might be a “chicken or the egg” argument, it is hard not to see that the permanent increase of U.S. military presence in the Middle East went hand in hand with the rise of militant Islam and anti-American terrorism. How many Americans remember the 1996 terrorist bombing of a U.S. Air Force barracks in Khobar, Saudi Arabia? Nineteen U.S. servicemembers were killed and 498 wounded. Two years later, the embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya killed 12 Americans and hundreds of civilians and wounded 4,500 people. Then came the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67) in Aden, Yemen, killing 17 sailors and injuring dozens of others. Less than a year later came the 9/11 attacks, answered shortly by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. A little over a year later, under the false pretense that non-existent Iraqi weapons of mass destruction would be used against the United States, came the invasion of Iraq.
The 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia killed 19 U.S. servicemembers and injured nearly 500 more.
By the end of 2003, U.S. special operations forces had completed much of their mission in Afghanistan to capture or kill senior leaders and high-value targets within both al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The Pentagon, however, rather than putting their “swords” away somehow decided to “nation build” a medieval land of warring tribes into a Western-style democracy, ignoring the fact that our democracy took centuries and many great wars to achieve.
For the past 31 years, the brunt of the cost has been borne by the all-volunteer force. The majority of American citizens have not served (none were required to), and most know few who have. A few dozen—or even a few hundred—servicemembers killed per year was the cost of doing business. But where were the generals and admirals who should have stood up to the civilian leaders, without compromise, to say “enough,”—that foreign wars too often leave our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines dead and forgotten, and for what? Were the military’s senior leaders just following along in-line, waiting for their moment, their chance for another star, or a richly coveted post-retirement job with a “vendor.” Were they just inured to the burdens of the profession? Unable to see the giant machine in which they were cogs—the failed foreign policy that resulted in the spilling of blood and national treasure for questionable (if any) gain.
It is no surprise that the “war” in Afghanistan eventually became a bottomless money pit. More than a trillion dollars was spent; did it make our nation safer, or did it just make Washington-connected corporations rich? Some of that money was funneled back to Congress through campaign donations and favors, all the while young Americans were being killed and wounded. Walk into any Veterans Administration hospital and see first-hand the reality that was brought home.
So, with the most recent deaths and injuries at Kabul International airport—clearly caused by a lack of planning, foresight, and courage at the top—we witness more evidence of the ongoing tragedy and travesty that is American “foreign policy” and the willingness of senior military leaders to go along with it. Will we ever learn? History suggests, no.
Postscript: While some commenters on the actual article disagree with the author, I do not. I understand where he is coming from and follow his line of thought completely. The disconnect between the American public in general and the military and their assigned missions is indeed relevant. A quick “war story” if I may.
Serving as a temporary Chief of Staff at a command when the actual made a quick decision to retire, I had to handle my job as well for a few months while the Corps had to find a colonel for the billet. After a few months of this double duty my general, a fresh-caught BG, comes in my office with a cup of coffee to shoot the bull. Out of the blue he calmly says, Jim you know you will never make general.” To which I laughed telling him all I ever wanted to be was a Gunny. He asked if I wanted to know why, and of course I knew he wanted to tell me so I said yes.
He told me he knew several generals who would jump at having me as their COS because I had a knack of letting seniors (and juniors) know that if they cannot handle your answer they should never ask me the question. He said generals cannot do that. They must always speak the party line or they will never move above one star, which is why so many generals retire as a BG. They spoke outside the party line once and were passed over, or they want nothing to do with it and retire.
Personally, I took his comments as compliment as that philosophy helped me to rise from private to colonel, and I was not about to change it. When a general speaks, understand he is never telling you what he truly believes in his heart. He is simply a mouth piece for the admisntration at the time.
Who is Bing West? In case you do not know of him here is a quick rundown from Wikipedia of his early life as a Marine and shortly thereafter:
West was an infantry officer in the Marine Corps during the Vietnam War. He led the mortar platoon of 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines. Later, he served with a Combined Action Platoon that fought for 385 days in a remote village. He was also a member of the Marine Force Reconnaissance team that initiated “Operation Stingray”: small unit attacks behind enemy lines. He authored a study at the RAND Corporation entitled “The Strike Teams: Tactical Performance and Strategic Potential”. This paper was the featured event at the 1970 Department of Defense Counterinsurgency Research and Development Symposium. The RAND Military Systems Simulations Group implemented a classified model of West’s concept. This doctrinal innovation was directly opposed by Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), which favored the Army’s concept of Air-Mobility “Fire and Thunder Operations”. By way of rebuttal, West wrote The Village, chronicling the daily lives of 15 Marines who protected Vietnamese villagers by living among them in their hamlets. The book became a classic of practical counterinsurgency and has been on the Marine Corps Commandant’s Required Reading List for five decades. (One of only three books I have ever read about the Vietnam War – great read if you’ve not).
Our disaster in brief
By Bing West
Following 9/11, a bit of wreckage from the Twin Towers was buried at the American embassy in Kabul, with the inscription: “Never Again.” Now Again has come. On the 20th anniversary of 9/11, the Taliban flag will fly over the abandoned American embassy and al-Qaeda will be operating inside Afghanistan. Fifty years from now, Americans will stare in sad disbelief at the photo of an American Marine plucking a baby to safety over barbed wire at Kabul airport. What a shameful, wretched way to quit a war.
The root cause was extreme partisanship in Congress. By default, this bequeathed to the presidency the powers of a medieval king. The Afghanistan tragedy unfolded in four phases, culminating in the whimsy of one man consigning millions to misery.
Phase One. 2001–2007. After 9/11, America unleashed a swift aerial blitzkrieg that shattered the Taliban forces. Inside three months, al-Qaeda’s core unit was trapped inside the Tora Bora caves in the snowbound Speen Ghar mountains. A force of American Marines and multinational special forces commanded by Brigadier General James Mattis (later secretary of defense) was poised to cut off the mountain passes and systematically destroy al-Qaeda. Instead, General Tommy Franks, the overall commander, sent in the undisciplined troops of Afghan warlords, who allowed al-Qaeda to escape into Pakistan. Thus was lost the golden opportunity to win a fast, decisive war and leave.
Acting upon his Evangelical beliefs, President George W. Bush then made the fateful decision to change the mission from killing terrorists to creating a democratic nation comprising 40 million mostly illiterate tribesmen. Nation-building was a White House decision made without gaining true congressional commitment. Worse, there was no strategy specifying the time horizon, resources, and security measures. This off-handed smugness was expressed by Vice President Dick Cheney early in 2002 when he remarked, “The Taliban is out of business, permanently.”
On the assumption that there was no threat, a scant 5,000 Afghan soldiers were trained each year. But the fractured Taliban could not be tracked down and defeated in detail because their sponsor, Pakistan, was sheltering them. Pakistan was also providing the U.S.–NATO supply line into landlocked Afghanistan, thus limiting our leverage to object to the sanctuary extended to the Taliban.
In 2003, the Bush administration, concerned about the threat of Saddam’s presumed weapons of mass destruction, invaded Iraq. This sparked a bitter insurgency, provoked by Islamist terrorists, that required heavy U.S. military resources. Iraq stabilized in 2007, but by that time the Taliban had regrouped inside Pakistan and were attacking in eastern Afghanistan, where the dominant tribe was Pashtun, their own.
Phase Two. 2008–2013. For years, the Democratic leadership had been battering the Republicans about the Iraq War, claiming that it was unnecessary. By default, Afghanistan became the “right war” for the Democrats. Once elected, President Obama, who said that Afghanistan was the war we could not afford to lose, had no way out. With manifest reluctance, in 2010 he ordered a “surge” of 30,000 U.S. troops, bringing the total to 100,000 U.S. soldiers plus 30,000 allied soldiers. The goal was to implement a counterinsurgency strategy, yet Obama pledged to begin withdrawing troops in 2011, an impossibly short time frame.
The strategy aimed to clear villages of the Taliban, then leave Afghan soldiers — askaris — to hold them and to build infrastructure and governance linked to the Kabul central government. In a 2011 book titled “The Wrong War,” I described why this strategy could not succeed. In Vietnam, I had served in a combined-action platoon of 15 Marines and 40 local Vietnamese. It had taken 385 days of constant patrolling to bring security to one village of 5,000. In Afghanistan, there were 7,000 Pashtun villages to be cleared by fewer than a thousand U.S. platoons, an insurmountable mismatch. Counterinsurgency would have required dedicated troops inserted for years. President Obama offered a political gesture, not a credible strategy.
My experience was different. In trips to Afghanistan over ten years, I embedded with dozens of U.S. platoons. When accompanying our grunts, the askaris did indeed fight. But ten years later, it remains a mystery to me why our generals refused to acknowledge what our grunts knew: namely, that the Afghan soldiers would not hold the villages once our troops left.
This wasn’t due to the structure of their army. The fault went deeper. The askaris lacked faith in the steadfastness of their own chain of command. Afghan president Hamid Karzai reigned erratically from 2004 through 2014, ranting against the American government while treating the Taliban with deference. His successor, Ashraf Ghani, a technocrat devoid of leadership skills, antagonized both his political partners and tribal chieftains. Neither man instituted promotion based upon merit or imbued confidence in the security forces. Familial and tribal patronage pervaded.
From the Kabul capital to province to district, from an Afghan general to a lieutenant, positions and rank depended upon paying bribes upward and extorting payments downward. We were caught on the horns of a dilemma caused by our political philosophy. Because we wanted to create a democracy, we chose not to impose slates of our preferred leaders. On the other hand, the askaris had no faith in the durability or tenacity of their own chain of command.
In contrast, the Taliban promoted upward from the subtribes in the different provinces. While decentralized, they were united in a blazing belief in their Islamist cause and encouraged by Pakistan. The Afghan army and district, provincial, and Kabul officials lacked a comparable spirit and vision of victory.
Phase Three. 2014–2020. From 2001 to 2013, one group of generals — many of them household names — held sway in the corridors of power, convinced they could succeed in counterinsurgency and nation-building. That effort, while laudable, failed.
But that did not mean that a Taliban victory was inevitable. Quite the opposite. A second group of generals came forward, beginning with General Joseph Dunford. The mission changed from counterinsurgency to supporting the Afghan army with intelligence, air assets, and trainers. President Obama lowered expectations about the end state, saying Afghanistan was “not going to be a source of terrorist attacks again.” U.S. troop strength dropped from 100,000 in 2011 to 16,000 in 2014. With the exception of Special Forces raids, we were not in ground combat, so there were few American casualties.
Battlefield tactics shifted to what the Afghan army could do: play defense and prevent the Taliban from consolidating. By 2018, U.S. troop strength was lower than 10,000. Nonetheless, General Scott Miller orchestrated an effective campaign to keep control of Afghanistan’s cities. Afghan soldiers, not Americans or allies, did the fighting and dying. The last U.S. combat death occurred in February of 2020.
Nevertheless, narcissistic President Trump, desperate to leave, promised the Taliban that America would depart by mid 2021. He cut the number of American troops in country to 2,500. With those few troops, General Miller nonetheless held the line. The U.S. military presence, albeit tiny, motivated the beleaguered Afghan soldiers. When the Taliban massed to hit the defenses of a city, the askaris defended their positions and the U.S. air pounced on targets. In addition, our presence provided a massive spy network and electronic listening post in central Asia, able to monitor Russia, China, Pakistan, and Iran. At a cost of no American lives and 5 percent of the defense budget, Afghanistan had reached a stalemate sustainable indefinitely at modest cost.
Phase Four. Bug-out in 2021. President Biden broke that stalemate in April of 2021, when he surprised our allies and delighted the Taliban by declaring that all U.S. troops would leave by 9/11, a singularly inappropriate date. As our military packed up, the miasma of abandonment settled into the Afghan psyche. In early July, our military sneaked away from Bagram Air Base in the middle of the night, which triggered a cascading collapse. Once Afghan units across the country grasped that they were being abandoned, they dissolved. What followed was a chaotic evacuation from the Kabul airport, with the Taliban triumphantly entering the city.
Asked why he had pulled out entirely, President Biden said, “What interest do we have in Afghanistan at this point, with al-Qaeda gone?” That stunning fabrication was a denial of reality: Al-Qaeda are commingled with the Taliban in Kabul. As the world watched, America had to rely upon Taliban forbearance to flee. President Biden had handed America a crushing defeat without precedent.
Evacuees wait to board a Boeing C-17 Globemaster III during an evacuation at Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan, August 23, 2021.
President Biden has claimed that the ongoing evacuation occurred because the Afghan army ran away instead of fighting. In truth, the Afghan soldiers did fight, suffering 60,000 killed in the war. Their talisman was the American military. No matter how tough the conditions, somehow an American voice crackled over the radio, followed by thunder from the air. Those few Americans were the steel rods in the concrete. When that steel was pulled out, the concrete crumbled. The spirit of the Afghan army was broken.
During the month following the abandonment of Bagram Air Base, the Pentagon remained passive. In contrast, a month before the abrupt fall of Saigon in 1975, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger was concerned about the North Vietnamese advances. As a former grunt in Vietnam, I was his special assistant during that turbulent time. He informed State and the White House that he was ordering an air evacuation; 50,000 Vietnamese were rescued before Saigon fell. In the case of Kabul, the Pentagon took no such preemptive action.
Worse, selecting which Afghans can fly to safety has been left to State Department bureaucrats, although State has an abysmal ten-year record, with 18,000 applicants stuck in the queue. Each day approximately 7,000 undocumented immigrants walk into America; about 2,000 Afghans are flown out daily from Kabul. In the midst of an epic foreign-policy catastrophe, the priorities of the Biden administration remain driven by domestic politics and constipated bureaucratic processes.
What comes after the botched evacuation finally ends?
(1) A course correction inside the Pentagon is sorely needed. Our military reputation has been gravely diminished. The 1 percent of American youths who volunteer to serve are heavily influenced by their families. About 70 percent of service members have a relative who served before them. The Afghanistan War spanned an entire generation. What they took away from this defeat will be communicated from father to son, from aunt to niece.
To avoid alienating this small warrior class, the secretary of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs must put aside their obsession with alleged racism and diversity in the ranks. Former secretary of defense Mattis said that lethality must be the lodestone of our military. Sooner or later in the next six months, we will be challenged. Instead of again waiting passively for instructions, the Pentagon should recommend swift, decisive action.
(2) President Biden’s image as a foreign-policy expert is indelibly tarnished. As vice president in 2011, he vigorously supported the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Iraq. Three years later, U.S. troops were rushed back in to prevent Iraq from falling to the radical Islamists. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote at the time, “he has been wrong on nearly every major foreign-policy and national-security issue over the past four decades.”
President Biden bragged that under his leadership, America was “back.” Instead, while denying that our allies were upset with his performance, he has destroyed his credibility. Perhaps there will be changes in his foreign-policy team, but President Biden himself will not be trusted by our allies as a reliable steward.
(3) In his Farewell Address, Washington wrote, “The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge, natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism.”
As Washington warned, due to extreme partisanship, the American presidency has accumulated the powers of a king or a despot. In matters of war, over the past several decades one party in Congress or the other has gone along with whatever the president decided. This tilts power decisively in favor of the White House. Congress has abdicated from providing either oversight or a broad base of public support. The White House as an institution has become regal and aloof — the opposite of the intention of the Founding Fathers.
Afghanistan, from start to finish, was a White House war, subject to the whims and political instincts of our president. The result was an erraticism that drove out strategic consistency and perseverance. A confident President Bush invaded Afghanistan, blithely expanded the mission, and steered a haphazard course from 2001 through 2007. Presidents Obama and Trump were overtly cynical, surging (2010–2013) and reducing (2014–2020) forces while always seeking a way out divorced from any strategic goal. President Biden (2021) was a solipsistic pessimist who ignored the calamitous consequences and quit because that had been his emotional instinct for a decade.
(4) Our Vietnam veterans were proud of their service. The same is true of our Afghanistan veterans. In both wars, they carried out their duty, correctly believing their cause was noble. After nation-building was designated a military mission, our troops both fought the Taliban enemy and improved life for millions of Afghans. With the Taliban now the victors, it hurts to lose the war, especially when the decision rested entirely with one man.
Who are we as a country? Who will fight for us the next time?
This article appears as “Who Will Trust Us the Next Time?” in the September 13, 2021, print edition of National Review.
Postscript. I have not always been a great fan of West. As a Marine in RVN he served courageously, and I loved his book The Village. However, it is always easy to be an armed chair QB and on Monday morning outline everything Tom Brady did wrong, despite his seven Super Bowl rings. He is obviously a good friend of the former Marine about whom I have nothing good to say. I’ll let you decide who that may be, albeit Bing mentions him several times in the diatribe.
Despite all that I do believe and agree with much he says, but then that’s Bing’s way, I mean it is Monday morning right?
I have been out of comms for nearly a month. Left on 27 July for a trip up the East Coast in the RV to visit friends, brothers, and family and returned this past Monday. But then you don’t need to hear all about that. What I did do of import was remove myself from eveything newsworthy. China could have nuked LA and I would have been oblivious. I sent out an email asking to hold all emails; sadly, some of you did not do that. I answered no emails, simply deleted them without reading them. I did not want to know what was going on in this once great nation, nor what that incompetent jerk living in our white house was up to. No emails, no internet, and no TV. What joy that was. Oh I did hear rumblings about things like Afghanistan, but could have cared less. I mean, let’s face it, I knew anything that administration would attempt would be a disaster since no one there has a lick of sense and any one in the military wearing a star and many wearing eagles are incompetent as well.
So now I am back, but remain aloof of the goings on in the sandbox. At my age and station in life, I really could care less. It has become somewhat fun watching what “they” do. American’s, in general are stupid, absolutely stupid! I read this a.m. where “his” approval rating is down to 44%. Which tells me 44% of our population are absolute imbeciles.
Anyway, just wanted to let everyone know Nancy and I have returned and I will try and keep the blog going, but mind you it might be about things other than that idiot in the WH. I did run across this one and thought I’d share it with you. Just another example of how stupid we are.
Semper Fi; Jim
A LOST LEARNING EXPERIENCE?
CIA Chief of Station, Saigon, Thomas Polgar, April 1975
WITH RECEIPT PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE ADVISING THAT EVACUATION AMERICAN EMBASSY SAIGON MUST BE COMPLETED BEFORE 0345 LOCAL TIME 30 APRIL, WISH TO ADVISE THAT THIS WILL BE THE FINAL MESSAGE FROM SAIGON STATION.
IT WILL TAKE US ABOUT TWENTY MINUTES TO DESTROY EQUIPMENT. ACCOMPLISH BY APPROXIMATELY 0320 HOURS LOCAL. WE MUST TERMINATE CLASSIFIED TRANSMISSIONS
IT HAS BEEN A LONG FIGHT AND WE HAVE LOST. THIS EXPERIENCE UNIQUE IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT SIGNAL NECESSARILY THE DEMISE OF THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER. THE SEVERITY OF THE DEFEAT AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF IT, HOWEVER, WOULD SEEM TO CALL FOR A REASSESSMENT OF THE POLICIES OF NIGGARDLY HALF MEASURES WHICH HAVE CHARACTERIZED MUCH OF OUR PARTICIPATION HERE DESPITE THE COMMITMENT OF MANPOWER AND RESOURCES WHICH WERE CERTAINLY GENEROUS. THOSE WHO FAIL TO LEARN FROM HISTORY ARE FORCED TO REPEAT IT. LET US HOPE THAT WE WILL NOT HAVE ANOTHER VIETNAM EXPERIENCE AND THAT WE HAVE LEARNED OUR LESSON.
Oaky, here we go again with the immigration issue. What’s the issue? Well, to begin, we don’t have an immigration policy in this country. Oh, forgive me, yes we do have a system, but can anyone tell me exactly what that system is? I am sure we all know immigrants who applied through the “system” and took them years to be vetted and eventually allowed to become an American citizen.
But the “system” we have today is based solely on political leanings. Mexicans at our southern border will eventually become democrats,. Come on, you know it, everybody knows it, especially since the creatures in the swamp will kowtow to their every needs, provide them with all sorts of benefits paid for by you and me. So why would they not vote for those who accepted them? They surely would not vote for those of us who try our best to keep the interlopers out! Agreed?
Okay, so know what about Cuban immigrants. Which way would they lean? Ahh, now we see a different set of immigrants and a different “system.” So, does it not surprise anyone that the douchebag in charge, who by the way, happens to be a Cuban immigrant himself said they will not be allowed ashore in America.
This whole immigration thing is laughable and very simple. If you lean left come on in, if you lean right. get the hell out of here.
US immigration is unnecessarily complex. It has evolved into a patently unfair system to everyone who enters the system honestly and with good intent — who seeks lawful admission. It favors those who skip ahead of everyone else and go to the head of the line. US officials created this problem; illegal invaders only take advantage of an opportunity handed to them by political leaders who are either nefarious in their intent or incompetent. You know, people like Biden/Harris whom the American people overwhelmingly elected. If our immigration system is broken, then we broke it.
This must change. No one has a right to come here, but if immigrants knock on our door, it must be in accordance with our laws and procedures. Yes, we need a border wall, but we also need a commitment to our immigration system. No one must come here by cutting in front of the line. No one must come here who cannot contribute to the American economy, who will not embrace American values, and who will not assimilate American society. No “child” must come here without their mother or father.
There is no question that the United States of America is the best place on the planet to live, but does that mean that everyone who lives in a nation less vibrant than our own has a case for political asylum? If everyone who lives in a country ruled by petty dictators or religious despots has an asylum claim, then literally two-thirds of the world’s population will soon show up at our door. There ARE limits, after all, to the number of immigrants our economy can support. People who do not/will not speak our language, who are not educationally prepared for the challenges of our economy, and who know less about our values than they do about speaking in English simply do not have a realistic expectation of success. Note: most Latin Americans are illiterate in their own language. At some point, we must acknowledge that there are (pragmatically) limited opportunities for goat-herders-turned taxi drivers in Newark.
Although with that said, from a historical point of view, the cultural differences between Spanish and Anglo immigrants could not be more unambiguous. I can readily see why Democrats are anxious to accept tens of thousands of Latinos as potential citizens: they are far more inclined to do whatever the government tells them than people of British stock. It also occurs to me that for every individual who runs away from their own country, whatever those conditions are, there is one less person available to fight for meaningful change in the land of their birth and cultural heritage.
Secretary Mallorcus told us that Cubans must not be allowed to come to the United States. Shouldn’t this standard apply to every immigrant who is trying to jump ahead in line or who files a frivolous petition for asylum? Should we return all such people to their home country (or, as he suggested, a third country) until US officials process their claim in an orderly fashion? Note: I’m not sure how French-speaking Haiti would be a good fit for immigrants from Guatemala, but that was his idea, not mine. I suspect there are few Spanish-speaking countries in the Americas willing to accept Guatemala’s problems. Nor should we. What we observe unfolding along our southern borders is only a “humanitarian crisis” because we’ve made it into one.
Sending people back to their home country for processing reinforces the traditional process of putting the names of people hoping to immigrate to the US on a waiting list, which is the only way we have of properly vetting applicants for admission to the United States. There is an exception to every rule, of course, but exception must not become the rule. We must maintain an orderly process of immigration.
Notice that tens of thousands of people, having spent their entire lives living in a communist/socialist country, suddenly appear on our southern border demanding entry to a country in which half of the population can support a communist/socialist administration. Is this not an example of politically compliant people trying to leap from a frying pan into a fire? I find the whole situation very odd, and I wonder why we Americans think we need more communists in our country rather than fewer.
Go Morning Folks, here we are on a Monday; took the weekend off to relax and take in some TV. Meanwhile the swamp creatures were hard at work doing what they do best e.g., create anger, divisiveness, hate, tell lies, and BS gullible Americans. And of course puppet Joey continues to react to his string puller – Obummer. Anyway, here is another good one from my friend Greg. If you looked at the “Shopping – California Style” post and then read this one, it becomes obvious that sooner rather than later that style of shopping will be prevalent throughout our Third World shit hole, once referred to as United States of America. Just walk into a store pick out what you need (or just want) and walkout. I mean isn’t that the ultimate goal of defunding the police?
In the mid-1980s, it was perhaps the nation’s most anticipated civil service exam. After a series of layoffs, retirements (my Dad being one of them) and a hiring freeze courtesy of the late ‘70s malaise, the NYPD was looking to replenish their diminished ranks.
Despite a sweeping crack cocaine epidemic and a record number of homicides, there were many more applicants than openings. Aspiring candidates hailed from not only the city’s five boroughs, but throughout the country. Having taken the test on Manhattan’s Lower East Side, it was quickly evident that the test site, Seward Park High School, was for those from outside the city. And we were there in droves, classroom upon classroom.
Today, the NYPD is shedding officers like a Siberian Huskey in late June.
Last year, over 5,300 either retired or quit, a 75% increase from the year before – 15% of the total department. Nearly 1,000 officers have left in the first half of 2021.
According to the Philadelphia Inquirer, “The Philadelphia Police Department has 268 vacancies, and are expecting plenty more.” The New Jersey State Policemen’s Benevolent Association said their state is also facing a recruiting crisis as they usually receive up to 20,000 applications – this year only 2,023 qualified applicants applied.
As the summer policing season heats up nationally, the stories of how police departments are dwindling are legion. Recently, a Portland, Oregon volunteer rapid response police unit resigned en masse. Many city halls are seemingly defunding their police through attrition.
The National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund said police officers suffered 295 on-duty deaths in 2020 – the most ever since they started keeping records in 1786. When a city is not supporting their police, the working conditions become nearly impossible. When police stand-down, criminals step-up proving that criminality abhors a vacuum.
When you vilify every police officer for another’s poor decision, who wants the job? The “defunding the police” crusade and the endless negative media coverage of law enforcement has made anti-police sentiment mainstream. Such overt posturing has only fueled a police shortage nationwide. Provided a cop killed Hitler, the national media would mourn the loss of a promising Austrian artist and vegetarian.
This anti-cop virus has become a pandemic in high-crime neighborhoods that are in most need of policing. It remains a deterrent for police to act and most of all, it is a disincentive to remain on the job.
Black Lives Matter (BLM) prefers community watches, preferably Omega, Tag Heuer and Rolexes. Atlanta City Councilman Antonio Brown, a defund the police disciple, had his Mercedes stolen and it took police over an hour to respond. The BLM communities that support defunding deserve a year of no policing.
This universal defund movement is a logical incoherence with French Revolution overtones that underscores how critical the Second Amendment is as a constitutional right.
How far left will the anti-cop pendulum swing and disincentivize good people from pursuing a career in law enforcement and what will be the long-term damage to our communities?
Once upon a time in America, the police were to be respected. You cannot expect law and order when you malign its enforcement, while at the same time failing to hold certain groups responsible for their criminality. We demoralize police by treating criminals like victims and cops like criminals.
Apparently, nothing justifies deadly force. That’s what future victims hear, and it will only encourage more recklessness. The left beatifies as paragons of humanity those who resist arrest. For those who disagree with this woke ideology: fear and intimidation and perhaps loss of their job.
Feckless leadership that ended quality of life “broken-windows” policing, imposed no-bail laws, disbanded street-crime units, while adopting policies to empty prisons. Catch and release may work while fishing, but it is a lousy way to police a community.
The protagonists of the defund movement reside in communities where crime is not much of an issue. To people living in crime-ridden neighborhoods, having an effective police department is a crucial part of daily life.
Make no mistake our freedoms are in jeopardy as the facts are difficult to ignore. We must respect the law and those who work to enforce it because any war on policing puts everyone at risk.
No exceptions!
Okay, what’s say we go shopping this week, California Style? LOL. Of course I jest, but you just watch, so many companies have made rules about non interference, under the guise of protecting their employees. When they do that, the invitation is out, “Come and get what you want or need. Hell hire us old farts, arm us, and we will lower your shoplifting stats immediately! What say you guys?
