Generals Investigating Generals – Really?

I know Col Anderson having personally served with him. He has been a thorn in public officials’ sides for many years. Even while on active duty he was an avid writer. For example, In December 1988, in a Washington Times article,  Gary criticized the Air Force, suggesting that it be dissolved and folded into the other military branches. The piece earned him a  personal call from the Commandant and a temporary stay from public writing. “He took my crayons away for a while,” Gary said.
I suspect no one reading this post will have difficulty agreeing with Gary’s thrust. That abysmal, downright disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan where Marines lost their lives needs to be thoroughly investigated and some one in the hierarchy held accountable, and I don’t mean some colonel or brigadier general. Heads need to roll, but  generals investigating generals is a joke. The upper echelon of flag officers are as inept and unprofessional as they have ever been.. Let’s just refer to them as members of the GPA (General’s Protective Association). Put retired senior enlisted and field grades who ate Afghan dirt on the investigation team, and we will find the truth.
There is so much truth in this article about our generals. Read and learn.

Keeping the Generals Out of the Afghanistan Investigation Is a Great Idea

6 Jan 2022
Military.com | By Gary Anderson

Our general officers should not be allowed to investigate themselves, and any conclusions about the rapid collapse of the Afghan government and its military forces inevitably will be tied to the actions of those officers who for two decades shaped U.S. strategy.

The recently passed annual defense policy bill includes a requirement for a new study of the failures in Afghanistan. In the past, it was pro forma to appoint retired flag rank officers, usually four-stars, to lead such an investigation. The current legislation precludes the generals and admirals who were part of the problem, as well as members of Congress serving since 2001, ostensibly a roundup of all of those who were responsible for the decisions made in Afghanistan.

That is a good call, but giving the Investigation three years is not; the war will be ancient history by then.

Several recent opinion polls suggest that the traditionally high regard that Americans have held for our military is eroding. But a closer look shows that the public still respects our troops. It’s senior military leadership that is losing the trust of the public. Americans appear to be far ahead of Congress, which let the generals who fouled up the Afghan evacuation off the hook with a proverbial slap on the wrist during hearings last fall.

The sad truth is that our flag rank officers have become merely another political interest group. They know that upon retirement they will be appointed to the boards of think tanks, corporations and universities. Going along to get along is the norm, and one never criticizes another member of the club.

This careerist, risk-avoiding atmosphere has been developing for years. Not all modern general officers are guilty, but far too many are. This goes a long way in explaining why no senior flag officer demanded that serious questions be asked about the course of the war in Afghanistan while their subordinates, particularly in the enlisted ranks, knew it was going sideways for two decades.

I listened as soldiers and Marines complained bitterly of being told that they had to abandon terrain that they had fought hard to take and hold because a general officer miles away had decided that it was no longer important or that the Afghans would take over, when it was obvious that they were not ready. Some of the revolving door American commanders in Kabul tinkered at the margins, but none had the intestinal fortitude to ask the really hard questions such as:

  • Why did we create an Afghan army in our own image? Soldiers from Herat in the west were defending Kabul while soldiers from Kabul were defending distant Herat. Regional forces would have made sense. That was the way the Taliban organized; they were not dependent on outside supplies that might or might not arrive, or far away chairborne Afghan generals who were pocketing soldiers’ pay. Such a reorganization was possible even as late as 2019, but the idea was never seriously considered.
  • Why was the Afghan air force not a priority? Given the nation’s abysmal road system, the only way to support remote army posts was by air. The Afghan air force was always a secondary consideration. Support to the air force was one of the first capabilities to be eliminated as the decision to leave was implemented while remote outposts were being left to wilt on the vine, and no American general officer had the moral courage to go public with the fact that the organization could never be self-sustaining.
  • About roads, why was the completion of the Ring Road, which would have connected the nation to Kabul, never a military priority? Instead, construction was left to often corrupt civilian contractors who lacked the ability and force protection to operate in contested areas. In 2012, my civilian District Support Team and our military partners in the remote northwest of Badghis Province were still totally dependent on NATO aerial resupply. That was 11 years after the initial NATO incursion. Nonetheless, no U.S. commander voiced opposition to handing over the province’s defense to the Afghan government, which was totally unprepared to assume the responsibility. Instead of publicly telling President Barack Obama the truth, the American commander of NATO forces, Gen. John Allen, punted.
  • Finally, as it became obvious that we were going to quit the country, why was the defensible Bagram Air Base abandoned in the dead of the night and the vulnerable Kabul Airport chosen as a point of embarkation? This was military incompetence of the highest order. Thirteen service members died unnecessarily, and no one has yet been held accountable. The same holds true with a drone strike that decimated an innocent Afghan family.

Who then should make up the congressionally mandated Afghanistan investigation commission? There are many retired midgrade officers who served in Afghanistan and have gone on to succeed in business and in the academic world over the past few decades; some are now in Congress. The same holds true of any number of enlisted personnel who have achieved advanced degrees.

People who saw the war up close should make up the commission. There should also be retired State Department and CIA operatives who knew what was really going on while the generals acted as combat tourists, occasionally visiting the troops and handing out challenge coins.

Without the perspective of those who did the real fighting, we will learn nothing.

Originally posted 2022-01-08 09:59:53.

15 thoughts on “Generals Investigating Generals – Really?”

  1. Sir
    Col Gary Anderson was my battalion commander – 3RD LAR BN. I concur with his assessment and recommendation. His paper on dismantling USAF was outstanding. I was with him when he got the call from CINCPACFLT, MARFORPAC, DOD, etc. I attended three of the funerals of our brave warriors from SOCAL who Marines from 2/1 that were put into harm’s way needlessly. No one was relieved over the Brandon Afghan Disaster. I read today the US ARMY is now offering a $50,000 enlistment bonus for six years if you go Infantry, Airborne, Ranger, SF, etc. Not sure if the USMC will match those numbers.

    1. The Corps will have to do something similar as they are not making their recruiting goals and have not done so for months!

  2. Since WWII our General Officer system has failed to demand excellence in command. During WWII A number of General Officers were releaved and transferred back to the states to management jobs, often at reduced ranks for battle field failure. Since the Purge by Obama the Managers have completely entrenched their position in high command and star level positions. I say positions as few seem to really command.

    Today’s Generals and Admirals would have quickly been removed probably even before they would have left the US for overseas duty. Even in Vietnam few would have risen to command in the field, perhaps at Saigon in Headquarters there but likely not in the field with combat troops.

    Our last 3 CMC’s have not served with the leaning forward leadership of their predecessors, instead they came from the managers rather than our Corps combat leaders.

    Heads need to roll for accountability and the managers and MBA’s need to be sent packing! Semper Fi DB Wright

  3. We have our own 4-star General very close to the center of this whole Afghan debacle: General Frank McKinsie. USMC, CENTCOM. I have known him over the years. Yet, I totally agree with all said above. And I add, If the Corps and one of its 4-star’s can’t be accountable for their actions and/or inactions, then it is useless to criticize other Gernerals and the slimy civilian politicians involved. We, as USMC officers, live and breath accountability. God help us, if we stop being who we are.

    1. Amen to all you’ve said Chuck. They relieve officers for woke BS under the guise of “loss of confidence,” but lose a war or conduct a withdraw such as that in AFG and . eh, carry on general. Our lack of morals and integrity has brought us to the level of a third world shit hole.

      1. Colonel, you are one who gives a voice to those who refuse to follow into that “shit hole.” God bless you for that, I have done far less for Corps and Country, and ashamed to admit so. Chuck sends

  4. I agree with Colonel Anderson, particularly concerning the “special interest group,” which we used to call the good old boy’s military network. I do question, however, why we bother with drawn-out investigations when nothing good ever comes from them. It’s sort of like never learning any lessons from history. And, in any case, all congressional investigations are partisan; they start as an inquiry into (fill in the blank) and quickly escalate into a cheap gotcha contest.

    These investigations are so commonplace that no one in middle American gives much of a damn about them — and the reason for this is that no flag officer responsible for disasters such as Afghanistan is ever held to account for his incompetence or malfeasance. Why is that? Well, I suppose because, as in the case of Sergeant Schultz of the old sitcom Hogan’s Heroes, they were just following orders.

    Anderson is right to observe that the American people have lost their confidence in the military’s senior leadership. No one expects a four-star general to engage in oral sex with his biographer in exchange for allowing her access to classified information — and pretty much get away with it. Maybe the services should revisit their flag officer selection criteria; perhaps include some standard of integrity and nobleness. Heck, the promotion boards might even give precedence to officers who’ve distinguished themselves in a combat command.

    1. Amen Mustang. I doubt anything would ever come out of an investigation. The culprits would eventually squirm their way out of everything and anything. I have no faith at all at any of the flag ranks

    2. After getting back from an infantry tour in Iraq, my E-4 son said, “Dad, I’d get in more trouble for losing my weapon that generals get into for losing the war. Once again, out of the mouths of non-coms.

  5. Here, here! Put the general-discharged Lt. Colonel Stuart Scheller on the commission. He’s the only one, so far, with the guts to lay everything on the line and call a spade a spade.

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