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Who Moved My Cheese?

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Well written piece by a Cmdr USN, (ret)

SECNAV Spencer is a fan of the business book, “Who Moved My Cheese?” During his confirmation hearing, in a discussion of the challenges facing our Navy, he stated,

There’s a lot of cheese-moving that has to be done.

What does he mean regarding “cheese-moving?” From the review of the book from Library Journal;

This is a brief tale of two mice and two humans who live in a maze and one day are faced with change: someone moves their cheese. Reactions vary from quick adjustment to waiting for the situation to change by itself to suit their needs. This story is about adjusting attitudes toward change in life, especially at work. Change occurs whether a person is ready or not, but the author affirms that it can be positive. His principles are to anticipate change, let go of the old, and do what you would do if you were not afraid.

Well SECNAV, you don’t have to look for where the cheese is when it’s dropped right in your lap.

A tragedy can often be a catalyst for change. Tragedy often comes from a failure and it can open an opportunity to address root causes of that failure if the right leadership has the right tools and vision.

There is no question that our Surface community has a systemic problem in how it accesses, trains, rewards, and utilizes its Surface Warfare Officers. It was an identified problem when I was a MIDN three decades ago, and the commentary and panel discussions over the years on the topic are almost beyond counting.

To survive that culture has become a strange badge of cultural honor like Black Lung was to coal miners a century ago, or surviving the hazing rituals of the old Soviet Red Army. That isn’t a good thing – yet we allow it to persist.

Has this culture produced excellence? That is an open question. It is generally considered by both long time friends and potential future foes that though though the US Navy may be the largest navy, it is not the most proficient navy when it comes to fundamental seamanship. Training is part of that, but culture is the primary cause.

The USS ANTIETAM in January, USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN in February, USS FITZGERALD in June, and this month’s USS JOHN S. MCCAIN are giving a clear signal – again – that the long-standing critique is correct.

We can fix this, but we must have the will to do so.

This AM, retired Admiral James Stavridis tweeted out four areas to look at;

Especially the first three factors, this is spot on – and is where the SECNAV should focus.

To address this challenge, we do not need another Balisle Report to be put on a shelf until the next tragedy. We can fire CO & XO every day and Fleet Commanders every fortnight and it will not move the ball forward.

No, we need an unbounded review of the career training, progression, and incentives for our Surface Warfare Officers. Get that right, and then focus on equipment and the rest.

We do not need industry “experts” or consultants. We’ve tried that, it doesn’t work. Operational Pauses are nice and needed, but they are band-aids on a melanoma. Time to try something different.

First, invite the last three Royal Navy exchange officers who deployed with USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81) for a Chatham House Rule open-ended discussion.

Next, get a gaggle of Fleet Lieutenants, one each, on sea duty based out of Norfolk, Mayport, San Diego, Pearl Harbor, and Japan. No DC LT. No shore duty guys. If you need recommendations, drop me an email. In 72-hrs I’ll have a list of experienced, opinionated, critically thinking JOs who would be glad to talk to you – and no; you don’t need more than five. Spend an hour 1-on-1 with them, and then the next day talk to them as a group from 0800-1100. Just you.

When that is done, call your counterparts in the UK and The Netherlands. They are generally regarded as some fo the best out there, and have a service culture of speaking bluntly. Ask them how they develop their Surface Warfare Officers, and what their SWOs think of their American counterparts. They have opinions – trust me.

When that background is done, then you will have a bit of objective information you will need to engage with the bureaucracy that is set in their ways, scared of change, and insecure in their own beliefs. They will offer the same bromides and excuses they’ve rolled in the way of any meaningful change focused on the core seamanship shortcomings and perverse incentives that are the source of our problems.

We have good uniformed leadership in place, but to do more than publish reports and relieve people of Command, they need more. To instead change culture, habits, policies, and attitudes that no longer provide the best solution for our Navy – they will need a SECNAV with the drive, vision, and endurance to lead them to a better surface force.

Oh, there are still over four months left in 2017.

Originally posted 2017-09-01 09:33:04.

Current Events

The Three “M’s”

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I know the author of this article. We never served together in the same unit, but during our careers we were within shouting distance of one another numerous times. Gary is the kind of Marine with whom I could saddle up to the bar at happy hour on Friday night at the O’ Club and shoot the bull. By that I mean we thought alike, had the same philosophies about Marine issues such as training, conduct, discipline, leadership, and the individual Marine himself. I fully concur with Gary in everything he says in this article. In fact, I would be shocked if any of my readers are not in agreement as well.

In the book I talk about some commands in which I served and one in which I commanded that were prime examples about which Gary is talking. An undisciplined command is like the old saying, an accident waiting for a time and place to happen. My fear is that with the current direction our military is headed accidents will be the daily headline news.

14 Feb 2022
Military.com | By Gary Anderson

 

 

The opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Military.com. If you would like to submit your own commentary, please send your article to opinions@military.com for consideration.

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps colonel. He served as a special adviser to the deputy secretary of defense and as a civilian adviser in Iraq and Afghanistan.

CBS’ 60 Minutes recently broadcast a feature on accidental training deaths in the military. The segment focused on technologies that could reduce fatal vehicle accidents. Training and discipline were barely mentioned.

I think they missed the point.

Most military accidents, in my experience, occur in units with lax discipline and inept leadership. I came to this conclusion early in my Marine Corps career.

As a young first lieutenant platoon commander, I joined a company stationed in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The company was commanded by a former enlisted man who had risen through the ranks by doing well in combat in Vietnam. He believed in hard and realistic training but had a “boys will be boys” attitude regarding off-duty conduct.

The company lacked discipline and had a “cowboy” mentality in the field that troubled me. During a tank-infantry exercise, a Marine who was riding on the back of the lead tank fell off and was killed by a tank that was following behind. He should not have been on the vehicle to begin with.

The next day, the battalion commander called me into his office. His message was curt. “I just fired your company commander. You are the new commander. Square that mob away, or I’ll fire you too.”

I got the picture. I survived that command and went on to a few more over the course of three decades, but the lesson stayed with me. No Marine or sailor under my command ever died or was seriously injured in a training accident or while off duty. Nobody died in combat either, but I write that off to pure dumb luck. I am sure many people who served under me considered me to be a martinet, but all left under their own power, and not feet first.

I encouraged hard training, hand-to-hand combat and live-fire exercises, but all were conducted by the book. Over the years, I studied unit accident rates, and what I found confirmed my earliest observation: An undisciplined unit is an unsafe unit.

As I studied organizations that had poor safety records — and this included aviation units — there were four interrelated signs of underlying safety issues, but all are connected to leadership.

First is a unit’s incident rate. Serious incidents range from automobile accidents to off-duty bar fights.

Second is how commanders deal with such incidents, which one can find by looking at the Unit Punishment Book. If minor infractions are ignored or trivialized, an atmosphere of laxness sets in that tends to permeate the command.

A third indicator is maintenance. A commander can learn a lot about a unit by just walking around. A sloppy work area in a motor pool is a good indication that the little things in maintenance are not being attended to.

Finally, there is the attitude of the commander. “Cowboy” commanders who think that injuries or accidents in training are part of toughening the troops eventually are disasters waiting for an opportunity to happen.

The normal military response to a horrific accident is for higher headquarters to call for a “stand down” to examine safety procedures. This has always seemed to me to be a case of closing the barn door after the horse has escaped. If senior commanders would begin looking at the real causes of problems by spending time talking to the troops and poking around in their workspaces before accidents happen, we might prevent some of these events such as the five recent mishaps aboard the USS Carl Vinson.

One of the primary problems leading to a lack of leadership is command climate surveys. Too many commanders are more concerned with being popular than running tight ships, as the surveys can be critical to their career advancement. Gen. George S. Patton and Adm. William “Bull” Halsey likely would never have survived today’s command climate evaluations.

This brings me back to the Vinson. If the fleet commander would visit the ship and look at the indicators noted in this article, I think that he would find that several, if not all, are present in the Carrier Air Group — if not among the ship’s total complement.

Fortunately, no one has been killed … yet. This does not mean that the commanders are inherently bad, but they probably want more to be liked than respected or feared.

In war, a commander’s job should be to accomplish the mission with the least possible casualties. In peace, it should be to accomplish the mission without killing anybody.

The Three M’s; Mission, Men, Myself